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always flourish in the rocky soil of communal habit; this idea was developed with
special fervor a generation or two back by both Summer and Ehrlich (whose
views are taken as the starting point of the discussion of folkways and lawways in
Professor Geoffrey Sawer's book on Law in Society (1965), a discussion that
incidentally touches on many points made by Professor Jones). Nevertheless, the
climate of opinion seems to have suddenly become especially favorable to specula-
tion and research along these lines. It may be simply a matter of professional
fashion. But no doubt it also owes something to a growing feeling that across whole
areas of social life the law has tended to overreach itself or to go out of control or,
in the case of the criminal law, to do both simultaneously. Perhaps it is essentially
the same feeling that has led in the field of foreign affairs to a tendency to empha-
size the value of prudence and restraint and the need to bring commitments more
nearly into line with capabilities. At one time it would have been natural to state
the problem in terms of a failure to observe those limits to what is possible in
social life that are set by a principle of order in the world lying beyond the desires
and machinations of mortal men. One may insist that the problem is of far greater
complexity than this statement generally allows and yet still agree that there are
limits to what law and government can do, that wisdom and virtue lie in seeking
to discern those limits and abide within them.
EDWARD M. WISE
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR. By Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski
(eds.). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). Pp. 412.
This book consists of several cross-cultural and exploratory studies of judicial
decision-making, and is one of the first to appear in the developing field of com-
parative judicial politics. A product of many months of collaboration between
American and Asian scholars at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, it
deals chiefly with decision-making processes in the high courts of Japan, Hawaii,
India, Canada, Australia, and the Philippines. The Asian contributors are mainly
law teachers with a strong interest in the sociology of law; the American scholars
are mainly teachers of political science whose special interest is the study of judicial
behavior.
If this book has a common denominator besides that of decision-making by
courts it is the attempt by each author to employ or to fashion empirical tools
for the study of the judicial process. Beyond that the essays differ markedly in
their focus and methodological refinement. Pyong-Choon Hahm's essay, based on
opinion surveys, is a study of Korean public attitudes toward law as a method of
conflict resolution and how these attitudes are affected by modernization or
social change. Four essays, among the best in the book, deal with Japan. The first,
by Zensuke Ishimura, traces the development of empirical jurisprudence in
Japan and then discusses some examples of this work, focusing on criminal sen-
tencing behavior of judges for the purpose of identifying a set of variables that
explain differential sentencing patterns. James Allen Dator's study is an adapta-
tion of Eysenck's liberalism-conservatism questionnaire to Japanese high court
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judges,* coupled with an attempt to correlate the scale positions of the judges
with their party affiliation. Takeyoshi Kawashima uses the votes of Japanese
Supreme Court justices from 1947 to 1962 to define, in statistical terms, the rela-
tionship between majority, concurring, and dissenting votes with the justices'
political ideology and prior career patterns.
The judicial vote is also a basic unit of analysis in David Danelski's study of
the Supreme Court of Japan, Abelardo Samonte's report on the Philippine
Supreme Court, George Gadbois' essay on the Supreme Court of India, Donald
Fouts' and Sidney Peck's respective surveys of the Supreme Court of Canada,
and Glendon Schubert's treatment of the High Court of Australia. The general
pattern of these studies is to describe the socio-politico-legal setting within which
each court functions; to show how and under what circumstances judges are
recruited; to sketch the court's internal deliberative processes; to identify indi-
vidual judicial attitudes, values, and background characteristics; and to relate
these personal traits to judicial policies contained in court decisions.
Research techniques used to explain these relationships include - in the
measure of their complexity - personal interviews, content analysis of judicial
decisions, linear cumulative scaling, multivariate analysis, and causal analysis.
Although comparisons are drawn frequently between the findings of this research
and related data about the United States Supreme Court these studies are not
systematically comparative. The only essay in the book that might fit this descrip-
tion is Victor Flango and Glendon Schubert's study of simulated judicial decision-
making in Hawaii and the Philippines. On the basis of a hypothetical law case
submitted to Hawaiian and Filipino judges their research design sought to mea-
sure the effect of the judges' policy influences and their attitudes toward stare
decisis on decisional outcomes. Finally, Edward Weissman and David Danelski
contribute concluding essays on the direction of comparative judicial research,
Weissman sturdily defends the use of mathematical models in comparative judi-
cial research as a means of achieving optimal precision in any statement of the
relationship between variables, while Danelski discusses some of the requisites
incident to the building of scientific theories of comparative judicial behavior.
Traditional legal scholars may view with alarm this attempt to quantify
judicial values. Political scientists may doubt the desirability or even the reli-
ability of certain mathematical applications to judicial research. Students of
jurisprudence may question the epistemological assumptions of such research.
Nevertheless, this is an enterprising volume, filled with enough intriguing hypoth-
eses about the judicial process to keep the skeptics wondering and judicial re-
searchers at work for a long time. The merit of the volume is its conscious effort
to develop concepts and methods that will make the comparative study of judi-
cial decision-making empirically more reliable; for it seeks to specify and define
variables that can more readily be studied in contrasting environments. One does
not have to denigrate the value of intuitive insight to acknowledge the feasibility
of operationalizing concepts and of developing research instruments that will
render these concepts susceptible to systematic investigation in opposing cultures.
* See Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, London: Routledge and Kesan Paul
(1954).
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The editors have stated that the emphasis of the volume is one of explanation
rather than description. It is only fair to say, however, that even for the mathe-
matically uninitiated student of comparative judicial systems, among whom the
reviewer would include 'himself, this volume manages to contain much descrip-
tive information about foreign judiciaries that he is likely to regard as useful and
unlikely to find elsewhere. Lastly, the editors have the reviewer's assurance that
their book was no less favorably received because of the unpardonable error of
misspelling his name in the preface.
DONALD P. KOMMERS
CUSTOM, LAw, AND MoRALrrY. By Burton M. Leiser. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1969. Pp. 185. $1.45.
In the preface to the book, the author accomplishes two things: (1) to state
that ".. . until now, there has been no philosopher of custom and very little has
been written on custom and its relation to law and to morals"; (2) to frame the
nature of his philosophical search as ". . . if we are to understand the nature of
morals and laws, it is essential for us to concentrate first on the nature of custom
and its place among human practices." One would have to agree that little of
significant value has been produced with regard to customary practices, but there
is hardly a dearth of material relating to customs.
Certainly, no philosopher has published any extensive works classified as
dealing with customs,1 but in legal studies custom has received more than its
ordinate share of attention. 2 As to the task ahead in the book itself, the reader
may be somewhat confused as to whether the author intends to discuss customs, or
if he is indirectly trying to find a justification for law and morals where the law
tends to produce a result inconsistent with either the will of the majority or the
minority in a given political group. Implicit in such an undertaking is the
predicate that a condition or fact such as the collective will of a political group
exists, and whether morality can achieve a definition without a primary concession
of existence having a religious or theological goal not ordinarily having recognition
within the term "philosophy." 3
Chapter One, entitled "What is Custom," is a detailed study and exemplary
presentation of the classification scheme of the author in his attempt to distinguish
I As regards the law, custom has largely been dealt with in the framework of the his-
torical school. See Maine, Ancient Law (1930); W. Holdsworth, History of English Law
(1926); T. Davitt, S.J., The Elements of Law (1959).
2 See S. Simpson & J. Stone, Law and Society (3 vols. 1948); Schecter, Popular Com-
mon Law in Medieval England, 29 Col. L. Rev. 269 (1928).
3 One of the more challenging discussions of existentialism in its historical, triadic form
is made by P. Tillich, The Courage To Be (1952), pp. 123-154. Leiser does not reach back
to lay a foundation for his philosophy of custom, but one must assume from the rejection of
natural law that he is logically placed within the ordinarily linear historical ontology of
Jewish theology, or perhaps in the idealist schools of positivism which are predicated upon
a transcendent duality of existence: God in heaven, and man on earth. Our reflection of
God being that innateness or potentiality reposed in mankind to develop toward something
better. See 3 K. Rahner, Theological Investigations (1967), pp. 54-85; A Maritain Reader,
Selected Writings of Jacques Maritain (1966), pp. 232-244.
